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The farm crisis of the 1980's precipitated much 
discussion from persons in all walks of life, especially 
in the Midwest where everyone knows someone who 
lost a farm or a business dependent on farming. Of 
special concern to the contributors to Is There a Moral 
Obligation to Save the Family Farm? is the decline of 
medium-sized farms which are operated by a family 
and/or extended family on a full-time basis.! It is the 
loss of a way of life, of farms passed from generation 
to generation, that is disturbing to most of the 
commentators who argue for the preservation offamily 
fanning. Economists bent on cost-benefit analyses with 
efficiency in dollars and cents terms are often cast as 
the opposition, although nobody that hardnosed is 
represented in this volume. On the affirmative side are 
those who try to give good reasons for what finally must 
be political and financial intervention to save a way of 
life that is fast-fading from American society. 
This collection of thirty-one essays brings together 
some of the best-known commentators and critics of 
agricultural policy, such as Wendell Berry, Gregg 
Easterbrook, Jim Hightower, Glenn Johnson, Richard 
Kirkendall, and Luther Tweeten. Expositions of the 
1985 Farm Bill by Jesse Helms and of the alternative 
Save the Family Fann Act, by Tom Harkin, provide a 
useful discussion of the options Congress has 
considered. To my knowledge this volume is the only 
one of its kind, and despite my reservations about some 
of the essays, it should serve as a valuable source for 
anyone interested in the fann crisis of the 1980's. It 
should also serve well as a text for courses in which 
agricultural problems are considered. 
About two-thirds ofthe essays consistofpapers written 
for a 1985 Iowa State University Conference, and one-
third are reprinted from other sources. Comstock has 
contributed a brief preface to each of the eight parts with 
additional suggested readings at the end ofeach, a general 
introduction, conclusion, and an index. 
The title notwithstanding, the essays do not 
constitute a sustained ethical or philosophical analysis 
of the question posed. Taken together, the articles do 
attempt to define the problems associated with family 
fanning in the 1980's. The volume has two apparent 
themes: (1) to show why failing small and medium-
sized farmers cannot be assigned complete respon-
sibility for their plight, and (2) to give positive 
arguments for saving these fanns and traditional rural 
American life. There is almost no one arguing for 
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plowing under the family farm, and only Easterbrook's 
article, which opens the debate, could be classed in the 
negative. Even Luther Tweeten in his rigorous 
economic analysis sets pure economic efficiency aside 
to claim that we ought to save the family farm on 
grounds that it is an important American tradition. So, 
the main debate here is not whether we have an 
obligation to save the family farm, but rather, which 
are the best reasons for fulfilling that obligation. 
The first theme is apparent in Parts III and IV. 
Kirkendall's excellent short history of AmeriCan 
agriculture gives the reader an even-handed look at how 
family farms came to decline from once accounting for 
over 70 percent of all households to less than 2 percent 
today. He focuses on broad trends and policies in many 
sectors of the U.S. Mechanization, hybrid seed techno-
logy, chemicals, commodity programs, and a general 
tendency ofAmericans to encourage big business have 
all played a part in making it possible for one person to 
farm many more acres than ever before, for subsequent 
increase in farm size concomitant with a decrease in 
farm numbers. Paul Lasley, a sociologist who has done 
extensive research on Iowa farm life, continues with 
an informative financial history of the policies leading 
up to the farm crisis. 'The 1970's brought a decline in 
world food production, and U.S. agricultural policies 
encouraged expansion ofproduction. Heavy investment 
in machinery and equipment followed, and farmers 
bought more land in an era of continued inflation. 
Bankers even encouraged farmers to take high-leverage 
loans. Near the end of the decade the Federal Reserve 
attacked inflation by raising interest rates, which 
increased costs of production. Simultaneously, exports 
began to decline, and land values fell precipitously, 
pushing a large number of family farmers to the brink 
of financial insolvency. 
In addition to the theme of acquitting farmers of 
complete responsibility, Lasley tackles "some tough 
ethical questions," wondering how to provide a 
justification for saving the family farm. He notes that 
the much-prized rural virtues of independence and self-
reliance have become less valuable to a society that is 
increasingly interdependent. Worse yet, those once 
esteemed virtues may lead to a "tragedy of the 
commons" when each person seeking his or her own 
self-interest may lead to the downfall of the whole group 
(p. 108). For these reasons, Lasley thinks any argument 
for saving the family farm must be one which 
encompasses the values of both the farm and nonfarm 
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population. Unfortunately, the question of how to 
balance the interests, suffering, and values of these two 
sectors is nowhere discussed in the book. The reason 
for this omission may be that such issues were beyond 
the scope of this volume. 
Neil Harl, an economist, gives a broad overview of 
the consequences to the national economy and to 
agriculture of political intervention in the form of 
commodity price supports, loans, and other government 
programs. Documenting the nature and extent of the 
financial stress experienced by farmers during the crisis, 
he notes that some of the vulnerability experienced by 
agriculture is not unique to it but instead is shared by 
"any sector or subsector that is both capital-intensive 
and export sensitive... " (p. 124). Harl's essay is 
important because it emphasizes the economic inter-
dependence of farmers with other sectors of society. 
So, he concludes that it might be wise to save family 
farms in order to save a myriad of other institutions 
that interconnect with them. 
Glenn Johnson gives a clear exposition of the 
economic consequences of leverage and its relation to 
efficiency. He points out, in opposition to the claims 
of many economists, that leveraged and nonleveraged 
farms do not differ in their efficiency, since each may 
produce the same yield per acre of crop. Moreover, 
society does not benefit from leveraged farms going 
bankrupt. The assets and labor of that farm may be 
worth more to society on the farm than anyone is willing 
to pay for them at auction (p. 156). So, the myth that 
the farmers who are squeezed out of business by being 
heavily leveraged in times of deflation are really just 
the bad managers and the inefficient farmers is 
dispelled. The real problem is not that we have too 
many farmers, but rather, that there is too much acreage 
in production. 
Jim Hightower repeats his well-known criticisms of 
the land-grant institutions for their apparent failure to 
carry out their mission to advance the cause of rural 
life. Established to aid the small farmer, the colleges 
have instead devoted considerable research time and 
money to the development of technologies which 
benefit large corporate farms and put smaller farmers 
out of business. 
Thus, in Parts III and IV we find the reasons to 
understand why those who are losing their farms are 
not simply bad managers who could be expected to fail. 
We are also introduced to several arguments for saving 
the family farm. Part V considers some of these 
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arguments more closely. Hightower continues his 
argument for the family farm, and one can infer from 
his remarks that family farmers are owed a redress for 
past injustices in the failure of land-grants to aid them 
through research. That takes the form of a societal 
promise unfulfilled. Luther Tweeten disagrees with 
Hightower, using statistics which should be compared 
with those in Hightower's earlier essay. Tweeten 
concludes that "public research, education, and 
extension programs have provided a massive contri-
bution to social justice by reducing costs of food" 
(p. 228). Low income people both here and abroad 
have enjoyed the greatest benefits. 
Tweeten's argument is based on a stated attempt to 
correlate his economic arguments with a utilitarian 
version of social justice. This will doubtless provide 
little comfort to Hightower and his supporters. 
Essentially, Tweeten has to agree that even if it is true 
that the land grants have not provided rural America 
with the benefits promised in the establishment of these 
institutions, no wrong has been done, since other people 
who are also needy were benefitted instead. Perhaps 
even more good (in economic terms) has been done by 
not fulfilling the mission originally prescribed. But 
Tweeten defines social justice solely in economic terms. 
Although Hightower does not make an argument for 
redress in just this way, I think it is open to him and 
others to reject Tweeten's argument on the basis that 
social justice involves not merely economic 
redistributions from high to low income groups but also 
questions of desert. The creation of social institutions 
brings concomitant justifications for their creation, 
which in turn bring into existence valid expectations in 
the populace for which the institution was created. 
These take the form of a contractual obligation on the 
part of government to provide specified benefits. 
Although utilitarian versions of social justice seem 
initially appealing, we do not think that justice should 
be gotten by false promises whether or not it maximizes 
economic profit or even societal conditions. 
In essence, rural Americans have trusted the land-
grants to benefit them while they, in turn, work and farm 
to benefit those others in need of low-cost food. Instead, 
rural America and family farms have been made worse 
off while others have benefitted. This is an injustice 
not simply because some are better off at the expense 
of others, but because farmers have a right to expect 
what has been promised them in the Morrill Act and 
subsequent legislation. Hightower does not use the 
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language of rights; his focus is on the failure of 
leadership of the universities. But to claim a right 
here for rural Americans would have moral and legal 
force not open to a utilitarian. While such an argument 
would not argue for preservation of family farms 
because of their intrinsic value, it would provide a 
basis for continued public financial support until such 
time as the land-grant institutions do attend to their 
original mission. 
Tweeten comments that mid-sized farms do realize 
the best economies of size but "lean toward 
inefficiency...due to greater costs of federal commodity 
programs, slightly higher food costs, and less exports," 
but these are offset by better rural social life than could 
be expected in an area populated only by larger farms 
(p. 228). Perhaps research directed to truly benefit the 
small and mid-sized farms would give them the 
competitive edge they need. This is a commitment that 
was made to rural Americans by the legislators in 
setting aside the land grants, the experiment stations, 
and extension service. They have every right to demand 
their due. 
The above argument from justice is not made 
explicitly in the book, although Comstock notes that 
Hightower is making claims based on the notion of 
desert. Its omission may be partially explained by its 
not having been represented in the speakers' talks of 
the 1985 conference. From a philosophical point of 
view, though, the book would be considerably improved 
by the addition of a thorough discussion of the most 
important ethical theoretical frameworks being debated 
in applied ethics today. Philosophers in this century 
have made an intense study of the relative strengths, 
coherence, and consistency of the nature and inter-
relationship of ethical claims. Especially well-studied 
are moral rights theories, Kantian duty-based ethics, 
and utilitarianism. Despite the claims of Tweeten and 
Comstock that utilitarianism is "the most widely shared 
ethical system in America" (p. 246: cf. p. 407), a look 
at the philosophical literature, at the legal system, and 
at the Bill of Rights of the Constitution will cast that 
claim into considerable doubt. Even ordinary people 
who think it right to bring about the most good will not 
agree that this should be accomplished without 
limitations that protect individual rights. A discussion 
of ethical frameworks could also shed light on the 
questions of distributive and retributive justice that 
underlie many of the other essays. While it is 
understandable that a 400-plus-page volume would have 
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little space for such additional material, one still cannot 
help feel its absence. 
As part of the conference papers, a section on 
religious ethics appears as Part VI. This section may 
have value to those who already accept the religious 
premises that underlie any further claims, but for others 
it may have less value. The problem is that to have any 
validity at all, one must first accept that God exists and 
that God is a law-giver and that those laws are open to 
clear understanding by all. The arguments have little 
meaning for one who rejects any of these conditions. In 
fact, the essays included in this volume exhibit a wide 
variation of interpretations of a Scripture which makes 
no explicit or directcommenton the complex issues facing 
farmers and policymakers today. Moreover, only the 
Christian tradition is represented, and these arguments 
may have little validity for those of other faiths. 
Comstock closes the volume with his own very nice 
summary of five arguments for saving the family farm. 
The first four he finds represented in the essays in the 
volume, and the fifth is his own contribution. These he 
titles the arguments from emotion, from efficiency, from 
stewardship, from cultural identity, and from 
responsibility. He thinks all but the last fail. The 
argument from emotion is expressed by those who 
would incite our sympathy, national pride, feelings of 
tradition, and the like. Comstock rehearses the reasons 
that such feelings alone do not constitute sufficient 
reason for ajudgment of moral obligation. Commenting 
that emotions are important to moral reasoning, he 
leaves the issue of how important they are or in what 
way they function unanswered. 
The argument from efficiency he finds wanting also, 
and here his criticisms take the form of invoking the 
standard objections to utilitarianism. This section is 
important because it is one of the few places in the 
volume where a systematic analysis of the consistency 
of our moral claims is attempted. However, Comstock 
appears at times to conflate utilitarianism and 
economics. A thoughtful utilitarian need not count 
economic efficiency as her sole value, and indeed, most 
do not. Classical utilitarians (Bentham, Mill) argue for 
the promotion of pleasure or happiness, and many 
contemporary utilitarians argue for the promotion of 
preference-satisfactions (e.g., Hare, Bennett). The latter 
group are neutral on value claims and would not make 
economic efficiency the primary value. Still, it would 
probably remain a value among other values, and could 
be an important consideration in concerns about equity. 
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Utilitarians can reject monetary economic efficiency 
as a supreme value, since it is well-known that such 
arrangements may not maximize preference-
satisfactions or even produce the most happiness 
overall. So, given the chance, a utilitarian could easily 
counter many of Comstock's claims, although I do agree 
that making arguments from economic efficiency alone 
fails as a justification for saving the family farm. 
Comstock also makes the claim that since 
arguments from efficiency are contingent in nature, 
they cannot be moral arguments. Apparently, a moral 
argument must be categorical in nature, and this is 
consistent with a Kantian view of morality and may 
be consistent with Comstock's own preference for a 
Christian moral framework, though he espouses a 
preference for a utilitarianism in combination with the 
Christian view. Still, the claim that arguments based 
on contingency cannot be moral arguments is false. 
The concern with what we ought to do always brings 
in considerations of fact, and no facts about the world 
are categorical-all are contingent. No arguments from 
efficiency are wholly contingent, however, since all 
make categorical claims about the value of efficiency 
itself. Perhaps what Comstock is concerned about is 
the absence of a categorical moral claim that would 
link the categorical value of efficiency to a categorical 
virtue extent in the activity of family farming. Only 
that link would allow us to conclude that family farms 
ought to be saved because they are most efficient. The 
problem is that we do not think such a virtue exists, and 
so the argument fails. 
Comstock's discussion of the argument from 
stewardship concerns secular and religious arguments 
for supporting family farmers as protectors of the land 
and domesticated species. In keeping with my 
comments above about the absence of an adequate 
discussion of moral rights frameworks, I have several 
concerns about this section. The secular position for 
this argument he takes to rest on rights-claims, and he 
mentions rights in the environment and Regan's view 
of animal rights. Unfortunately, there is no exposition 
of these arguments. Instead, he states that "it is 
extremely difficult to generate philosophical arguments 
that would convince most persons that land and animals 
have rights" (p. 409), and in the next sentence he 
reiterates that "the case is extremely difficult to make." 
The reader is not told why this should be so nor what 
Regan's reasons are for making his case. Instead, 
Comstock tells us that "most persons" don't believe 
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animals have rights, that Kant didn't think animals had 
rights, nor did Mill and Bentham. We are not told that 
Kant's theory would not allow the senile and insane 
rights either nor that Mill and Bentham would not 
ascribe rights to anyone, much less to animals. We are 
also told that "most philosophers" think animals do not 
have rights, a statement unsupported by data and 
irrelevant unless we assume that these philosophers 
have all read Regan's works and are prepared to refute 
his claims with sound arguments of their own. 
Comstock does think we should be concerned with 
animal welfare, but he gives theological reasons for this. 
They remain our tools, but we should not treat them 
cruelly. He does not admit a utilitarian duty to weigh 
the interests of animals along with those of humans. 
What we find in this section is a reiteration of the 
common belief that "there is nothing wrong with killing 
animals to feed ourselves so long as we do not cause 
them to suffer in the meantime" (p. 410). He does 
encourage development of farm practices which will 
insure the health and happiness of farm animals. 
Comstock does claim that animals and even some ways 
of life have intrinsic worth. That, combined with his 
apparent preference for categorical claims, suggests 
that, if he were to free himself from what appears to be 
theological permission to use animals to fulfill our 
needs, he might find that a consistent moral and even 
theological view would place him closer to Regan's 
camp than he supposes. 
Finally, Comstock attacks the question of whether 
family farmers are necessarily good stewards. 
Although Comstock thinks that "the case can be 
made... that fam ily farmers treat their animals best and 
are the best stewards of the land," he offers no data to 
support this claim. In fact, data offered in an earlier 
article showed that family farmers were no more likely 
to practice soil conservation than large corporate 
farmers, and Comstock's claim here apparently rests 
on the theoretical claim that family farmers should 
care more about the land, since they will be thinking 
about passing the farm on to their offspring. 
Apparently, this psychological factor does not carry 
enough weight to motivate all or almost all family 
farmers to be good stewards. 
But Comstock does not avail himself of this reason 
to reject the argument from stewardship. Again, he 
rejects the argument based on its contingency. Because 
we should preserve family farms only if it is the best 
arrangement for preserving the land and protecting 
Between the Species 
domestic animals, Comstock finds this argument failing. 
But, as pointed out above, contingent arguments can 
be moral arguments. It is simply that Comstock wishes 
to narrow the kind of answer we are seeking to that ofa 
categorical imperative that such arguments fail. Ifwhat 
we wish to know is whether we should save the family 
farm for the time being (something legislators might 
want to know), then an argument from stewardship, 
coupled with data showing family farmers are actually 
or even more likely to be good stewards, would present 
a good moral reason for preserving the institution. 
Unfortunately, the data are either lacking or 
unsupportive of the conclusion. However, since moral 
arguments are supposed to move persons to action, it 
might still be true that family farmers are more open to 
being motivated by the claim that they ought to be good 
stewards. If that were true ( and it seems to me such a 
claim is testable), then we might still make a claim that 
we ought to save the family farm as long as sufficient 
ways can be found to make family farmers behave as 
responsible stewards. Although I am not as convinced 
as Comstock that the argument from stewardship fails, 
a more thorough treatmentof this subject deserves more 
space than can be given here. 
The fourth argument that is discussed Comstock 
dubs the argument from cultural identity. Most of what 
is discussed is the supposed link between democracy 
and family farm ownership. Comstock accedes that 
Thomas Jefferson's claim of a necessary connection 
between private farm property ownership and 
democracy seems refuted. Nevertheless, he is 
concerned about the concentration of power that may 
result if farm operations come into the hands solely of 
large corporations. Thi~ is a serious problem that should 
concern us all. Still, it does not provide a basis for 
saying the family farm as such should be saved. Again, 
the reasons apparently connect to Comstock's 
requirement of a categorical reason. Another aspect of 
the cultural identity argument seems to be linked to the 
argument from emotion-that the family farm is "a 
structure that keeps us in touch with our emotions and 
our past, and thereby with ourselves" (p. 415). 
Comstock thinks that all of the good reasons 
offered in the four arguments above-caring and 
concern, efficiency, stewardship, and cultural identity-
while insufficient individually can work together to offer 
a strong argument (from responsibility) for preserving 
the family farm. Here, he invokes our responsibilities 
to future generations to pass on a good environment 
152 Summer 1991 
Defending a Way ofLife 
and a cultural heritage. He does not get what he had 
hoped for, namely, a categorical argument for saving 
the family farm. But this does not seem necessary 
anyway for reasons noted above. 
The question of what we ought to do as a nation 
seems to me to be more complex, however. Preservation 
of the traditional family farm and rural life will require 
the outlay of public funds; all are in agreement about 
that. Decisions about the rightness or wrongness of 
providing such funds must be made within the context 
of shrinking economic and natural resources and of 
other claims for the protection of many different kinds 
of interests. Some of these interests are based on the 
prior commitments of the government to serve the 
population in certain ways, and other interests take the 
form of claims concerning basic human rights. Family 
farmers must make their claims about justice within an 
ongoing social sphere that is populated, for instance, 
by the inner city poor and homeless, the increasing 
poverty of our children, high infant mortality, inequity 
in health care and education, and the continued 
mistreatment of animals and the environment. It may 
well be that we should save family farms, but there will 
be a price to pay in unmet needs of others. Thus, we 
must have a clearer understanding of the inter-
relationship of these interests and of how to give them 
just consideration. I think this precludes categorical 
conclusions about the fate of the family farm but leaves 
open the possibility for making good arguments about 
how our institutions should be arranged to protect the 
public interest and individual rights. 
Notwithstanding my reservations noted above, I 
recommend this book to those who are interested in 
exploring these issues in some depth. No text or 
anthology can encompass all views. Most of the essays 
are clear, well-written, and accessible to even the novice. 
I have no doubt that as a classroom text it will provoke 
a large amount of useful debate and enlightenment. 
Notes 
The definition of just what constitutes a "family-farm" 
has been the center of contention, since many large corporate 
farms, such as Cargill, are owned and operated by a family. 
rn the "rntroduction," Comstock accepts Luther Tweeten's 
definition with a modification noted here in italics: "a family 
farm is an agricultural operation loved, worked, and owned 
by a family or family corporation, with gross annual sales of 
forty thousand dollars to two hundred thousand dollars. hiring 
less than 1.5 person-years of labor" (p. xxv). 
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Response: 
The Rights of Animals 
and Family Farmers 
Gary Comstock 
Iowa State University 
It is a pleasure to be asked to comment on Kathryn 
P. George's review, and not only because she so 
insightfully criticizes the book I edited. Her review 
provides me the additional opportunity to declare in 
public that I have changed my mind about the respective 
rights of animals and family farmers. As George points 
out, I argue in my conclusion that you can defend 
traditional family farms and animals. My reason is that, 
even though the backbone of family farming is the 
raising and slaughtering of food animals, smaller sized 
"family" farms seem more likely than larger sized 
"factory" farms to provide animals with humane care, 
room to exercise, and quick, painless deaths. 
Since finishing Famity Farm, I have come to believe 
that humane care and slaughter are not the issues. The 
issues are whether we harm animals with central nervous 
systems when we kill them, and whether we have the 
right to continue breeding mammals, with no other 
purpose in mind than to carve them into steaks at a young 
age. This is likely to be the issue of most concern to 
readers of BTS, so I begin here, reserving for later my 
comments on George's criticisms of my family farm 
argument. 
I have learned from feminists and narrativists the 
value of first person stories in ethical discourse, and I 
think it is important for ethicists to tell their stories, 
especially when they have given up major parts of their 
background beliefs. I have given up a major part of my 
background beliefs, and I must tell you how it happened. 
I was not motivated by professional considerations 
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